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“Waiving” Goodbye to Medicaid as We
Know It: Modern State Attempts to
Transform Medicaid Programs
Through Section 1115 Waivers
Chandler Gray *
Abstract
This Note explores recent state efforts to reshape their
respective Medicaid programs through Section 1115 waivers.
Specifically, this Note looks at states that wish to convert their
Medicaid program to a block grant through Section 1115
waivers. Examining the lawfulness of these waivers requires
analyzing the language and application of both the Medicaid Act
and the Administrative Procedure Act. This Note argues that any
use of Section 1115 waivers to implement a block grant program
would be a violation of the Medicaid Act and thus unlawful.
Further, federal approval of such programs would be deemed
arbitrary and capricious. To justify this conclusion, this Note
considers three recent federal court decisions striking down
states’ use of Section 1115 waivers to enforce Medicaid work
requirements. This Note determines that any use of Section 1115
waivers to create a block grant program would face similar legal
challenges as the work requirements cases.
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“WAIVING” GOODBYE
I. Introduction

Six-year-old Asher lives with a chronic lung disease that
required hospitalization four times in 2019 alone. 1 She depends
on medication to help her breathe, and her family depends on
Tennessee’s Medicaid program to assist with Asher’s medical
coverage and costs. 2 In October 2019, Asher’s mother, along
with approximately sixty-five other Tennesseans, crowded into
a public library in East Knoxville, Tennessee to voice their
concerns over Tennessee’s proposal to convert its current
Medicaid funding into a block grant. 3 As part of this proposal,
Tennessee plans to change some of its Medicaid benefits,
including changing prescription drug coverage to exclude
certain drugs. 4 Asher’s mother spoke at the public forum to call
attention to this particular feature of the block grant proposal,
and criticized the lack of specificity in the proposal regarding an
appeals process. 5 Over the three days of public forums across
the state, nobody spoke in favor of the block grant proposal. 6
Tennessee’s proposal, known as Amendment 42, is part of a
recent movement by conservative states to reshape their

1. See Natalie Alison & Kristi Nelson, In Second Day of Public Hearings,
No One Speaks in Favor of Tennessee’s Block Grant Plan, TENNESSEAN (Oct. 2,
2019, 6:21 PM), https://perma.cc/4YN3-MVQP (last updated Oct. 4, 2019, 9:51
AM) (discussing the health challenges faced by Asher).
2. See Jessica Bliss, Lawmakers Discuss Ways to Support Families
Raising Children with Severe Disabilities but Cost a Key Factor, TENNESSEAN
(Feb. 28, 2019, 11:49 AM), https://perma.cc/X9DZ-X645 (last updated Feb. 28,
2019, 12:00 PM) (explaining the financial hardship faced by many families of
children with disabilities due to expensive medical care).
3. See Alison & Nelson, supra note 1 (noting that Tennessee’s
government held a series of public forums on the block grant proposal).
4. See TENN. DIV. OF TENNCARE, TENNCARE II DEMONSTRATION:
AMENDMENT 42, at 15 (2019), https://perma.cc/LK3A-G6LW (PDF) (discussing
the changes Tennessee wishes to make to certain classes of prescription drug
coverage).
5. See Alison & Nelson, supra note 1 (“[Asher’s mother] is concerned
about the state’s plan to cover fewer drugs under the block grant in order to
negotiate lower prices with drug companies.”).
6. See Brett Kelman & Adam Friedman, Tennessee’s Medicaid Block
Grant: 3 Days, 3 Public Hearings, Zero Support, TENNESSEAN (Oct. 3, 2019,
5:24 PM), https://perma.cc/9TMQ-C9Y5 (last updated Oct. 4, 2019, 9:51 AM)
(summarizing the results from the public hearings held by the Tennessee state
government).
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respective Medicaid programs. 7 These states employ what are
known as Section 1115 waivers (so named for their location
within the Social Security Act) 8 to propose demonstration
projects that attempt to integrate market-based solutions to
control Medicaid program costs. 9 However, as this Note will
argue, many of the Section 1115 waivers and subsequent
demonstration projects set forth by these states, including
Amendment 42, are unlawful. 10
Part II of this Note provides background information on the
Medicaid Act as well as Section 1115 waivers. Part III examines
two types of modern restrictive Section 1115 waiver programs:
work requirements and block grants. This Note focuses on these
two types of Section 1115 waivers because the Trump
Administration is advocating for states to adopt these programs
in its effort to transform Medicaid. 11 Specifically, this Note
scrutinizes Kentucky’s Section 1115 work requirements waiver,
Kentucky HEALTH; 12 Tennessee’s Section 1115 block grant
proposal, Amendment 42; 13 and the Trump Administration’s
proposed Medicaid block grant program, Healthy Adult

7. See Allison Baker & Linda Hunt, Counterproductive Consequences of
a Conservative Ideology: Medicaid Expansion and Personal Responsibility
Requirements, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1181, 1181 (2016) (discussing the use
of Section 1115 waivers by conservative states to alter their Medicaid
programs rather than simply expanding Medicaid).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2018) (permitting demonstration projects under
the Medicaid Act). This Note will refer to Medicaid waivers granted under
§ 1315 authority as “Section 1115” waivers.
9. See Baker & Hunt, supra note 7 (stating that conservative states use
Section 1115 waivers to promote conservatives’ ideas about health care).
10. See Rachel Sachs & Nicole Huberfeld, The Problematic Law and
Policy of Medicaid Block Grants, HEALTH AFF. (July 24, 2019), https://perma.cc
/Q2DC-RBC7?type=image (arguing that many modern Section 1115 waivers
are an attempt to bypass the law).
11. See id. (discussing the Trump Administration’s focus on the work
requirement and block grant waivers).
12. See KY. DEP’T OF MEDICAID SERVS., KY. HEALTH DEMONSTRATION 4
(2016), https://perma.cc/5WRZ-P764 (PDF) (providing an overview of the
Kentucky HEALTH waiver).
13. See TENN. DIV. OF TENNCARE, supra note 4, at iii (providing
Tennessee’s rationale for designing and requesting a block grant).
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Opportunity (HAO). 14 Part IV analyzes the court’s reasoning
from the Section 1115 work requirements cases Stewart v.
Azar 15 (Stewart II) and Gresham v. Azar 16 (Gresham II) to
illustrate how a court analyzes Section 1115 waiver proposals
against both the Medicaid Act 17 and the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). 18 Future litigation against Section 1115
proposals such as Amendment 42 would likely raise similar
arguments as those provided in the work requirements
litigation. 19 Thus, in Part V, this Note will apply the legal
reasoning in the work requirements cases to the issue of Section
1115 block grant proposals. 20 This Note concludes by
recommending that the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (Secretary) refuse to approve Amendment 42 and any
HAO waiver proposals. This Note also predicts that if the
Secretary were to approve these waiver proposals, courts would
strike down such approval as both arbitrary and capricious and
in violation of the Medicaid Act.

14. See Letter from Calder Lynch, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs.,
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to State Medicaid Dirs., SMD No. 20-001
(Jan. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/LF6E-76EH (PDF) (encouraging states to
apply for Medicaid as a block grant through Section 1115 waivers).
15. 366 F. Supp. 3d 125 (D.D.C. 2019).
16. 950 F.3d 93 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2018) (creating the Medicaid program as part
of the Social Security Act and requiring states to “furnish medical assistance”
to populations in need).
18. See 5 U.S.C. § 500 (discussing the general provisions of
administrative practice).
19. See Leonard Cuello, Medicaid Waivers: Courts Must Step in When the
Exception Becomes the Rule, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 892, 892 (2018) (arguing
that Section 1115 grants HHS only narrow authority and does not permit the
type of broad programs currently seen). But see Anthony Albanese, The Past,
Present, and Future of Section 1115: Learning from History to Improve the
Medicaid–Waiver Regime Today, 128 YALE L.J. FORUM 827, 828 (2019)
(arguing that Section 1115 grants permission to states to propose broad
policies).
20. See Sachs & Huberfeld, supra note 10 (predicting that Section 1115
block grant litigation will follow the same patterns as, and that the
government will fail to meet the legal standard articulated in, the Section 1115
work requirements litigation).

102

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 97 (2020)
II. Background on the Medicaid Act and Section 1115
A. The Medicaid Act

In 1965, Congress passed the Medicaid Act as part of a
monumental addition of health insurance programs to the
Social Security Act (SSA). 21 Medicaid provides medical
assistance to “categorically needy” persons, defined as those
needing public assistance based on “family circumstances, age,
or disability.” 22 The program depends on cooperative federalism,
where the federal government provides open-ended matching
funds to state Medicaid programs in exchange for compliance
with federal requirements. 23 These requirements ensure that
states provide coverage to certain populations based on factors
such as income, disability, and pregnancy status. 24 The nature
of Medicaid’s financing arrangement means that there is no
pre-set limit to the amount of money paid by the federal
21. See Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties:
Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2013) [hereinafter Endless Difficulties]
(stating that Congress amended the SSA to simultaneously include both
Medicare and Medicaid in response to calls for health insurance for the elderly
and poor); see also Friedman v. Berger, 409 F. Supp. 1225, 1226 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (“The Medicaid [Act] is an aggravated assault on the English language,
resistant to attempts to understand it.”).
22. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 37 (1981); see CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE & MEDICAID MILESTONES:
1937 – 2015, at 2 (2015), https://perma.cc/H6ST-36C4 (PDF) (stating that
Medicaid was originally passed to provide states “with the option of receiving
federal funding for providing health care services to low-income children, their
caretaker relatives, the blind, and individuals with disabilities”).
23. See Endless Difficulties, supra note 21, at 15 (discussing the Medicaid
program as a carrot and stick arrangement between the federal government
and the states); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519,
625 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Medicaid
is a prototypical example of federal–state cooperation in serving the Nation’s
general welfare.”).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395a (2018) (detailing different categories of
eligibility for Medicaid assistance); Malcolm J. Harkins, Be Careful What You
Ask for: The Repeal of the Boren Amendment and Continuing Federal
Responsibility to Assure that State Medicaid Programs Pay for Cost Effective
Quality Nursing Facility Care, 4 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 159, 162 (2002)
(“States that choose to participate, however, must administer their Medicaid
program in conformance with the Medicaid Act and applicable federal
regulations.”).
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government to the states. 25 Further, this financing structure
automatically adjusts state resources to account for
“demographic and economic shifts, health care costs, public
health emergencies, natural disasters and changing state
priorities.” 26 Currently, all states participate in the Medicaid
program. 27 The Medicaid program is designed to empower
states with the ability to design and control their respective
programs within the federally established parameters. 28
B. Section 1115
Although congressional intent regarding Section 1115 is
murky, 29 Section 1115 waivers serve as opportunities for states
to expand Medicaid eligibility to uninsured populations. 30
Specifically, Section 1115 waivers encourage states to design
research and demonstration programs that “develop innovative
solutions to a variety of health and welfare problems.” 31
25. See Robin Rudowitz et al., KAISER FAM. FOUND., MEDICAID FINANCING:
THE BASICS 1 (2019), https://perma.cc/AWR9-638M (PDF) [hereinafter THE
BASICS] (providing an overview of Medicaid’s financing structure).
26. Id.
27. See Endless Difficulties, supra note 21, at 15 (stating that every state
participates in the Medicaid program and as a result of participation receives
federal funds).
28. See Abbe Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What is Federalism in
Healthcare For?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1693, 1711 (2018) (characterizing Medicaid
as a “state-driven” health care program).
29. See Jonathan Bolton, The Case of the Disappearing Statute: A Legal
and Policy Critique of the Use of Section 1115 Waivers to Restructure the
Medicaid Program, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 91, 99 (2003) (“Section 1115
was enacted in 1962 with ‘virtually no legislative history’ to explain it.” (citing
Sara Rosenbaum, Mothers and Children Last: The Oregon Medicaid
Experiment, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 97, 111 (1992)) [hereinafter Mothers and
Children Last].
30. See John Holahan et al., Insuring the Poor Through Section 1115
Medicaid Waivers, HEALTH AFF. (Jan. 1, 1995), https://perma.cc/H4PGJ5V8?type=image (discussing ways states can expand the populations eligible
for Medicaid as a way for states to enact state-level health reform).
31. Id. (discussing the unique characteristics of Section 1115 waivers as
opposed to other methods by which states can expand Medicaid). See NICOLE
HUBERFELD ET AL., THE LAW OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 93 (2d ed. 2018)
(stating that the purpose of providing waivers is to encourage states to explore
alternative ways of providing Medicaid coverage to beneficiaries while still
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Although states use Section 1115 waivers to create state-specific
policy approaches to improving Medicaid implementation in
their respective states, the ultimate approval authority rests
with the Secretary. 32 The Secretary may “waive the
requirements of specific sections in the [Medicaid Act]” 33 so long
as the state’s proposed programs are “likely to assist in
promoting the objectives of the Medicaid program.” 34
Additionally, Section 1115 waivers and subsequent
demonstration programs must be budget neutral to the federal
government in order to receive approval. 35
The Trump Administration has approved a wide variety of
Section 1115 waivers, including waivers to promote healthy
behavior incentives, waivers that extend Medicaid eligibility to
new populations with behavioral health needs, and a waiver to
address social determinants of health. 36 New administrations
maintaining fidelity to Medicaid’s overarching purpose); About Section 1115
Waivers, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://perma.cc/QZR5WZUR (describing the purpose of Section 1115 demonstration programs as
finding state-specific policy solutions to serving Medicaid populations and
introducing evidence-based solutions to promote better health outcomes).
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2018) (vesting approval authority in the
Secretary).
33. Bolton, supra note 29, at 98 (discussing specific sections which the
Secretary may not waive compliance to in granting a state’s Section 1115
waiver).
34. About Section 1115 Waivers, supra note 31 (describing the balance
between state-specific policies and federal oversight necessitated by Section
1115 programs).
35. See Letter from Timothy B. Hill, Acting Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid &
CHIP Servs., Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to State Medicaid Dirs.,
SMD No. 18-009 (Aug. 22, 2018) (Re: Budget Neutrality Policies for Section
1115(a) Medicaid Demonstration Projects), https://perma.cc/3JV3-NLKP
(PDF) (“A budget neutral demonstration project does not result in Medicaid
costs to the federal government that are greater than what the federal
government’s Medicaid costs would likely have been absent the
demonstration.”); see also Eleanor D. Kinney, Clearing the Way for an Effective
Federal-State Partnership in Health Reform, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899, 911
(1999) (stating that the budget neutrality rule gained prominence due to a
Clinton administration policy change that encouraged the use of Section 1115
waivers to expand the Medicaid population).
36. See Elizabeth Hinton et al., Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstration
Waivers: The Current Landscape of Approved and Pending Waivers, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/W5FP-ZSKW (describing the
wide variety in approved Section 1115 waivers during the Trump
Administration).
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tend to build on the Section 1115 waiver trends of previous
administrations when approving new waiver requests, as well
as continuing ongoing Section 1115 waiver programs. 37
Legal challenges to Section 1115 waivers usually focus on
the requirement that the Secretary only approve those Section
1115 waivers that promote the objectives of the Medicaid Act. 38
However, courts generally interpret Section 1115 as granting
broad approval authority to the Secretary as long as the
Secretary indicates that the waiver will promote the objectives
of the Medicaid Act. 39
III. Examination of Restrictive Modern Section 1115 Waiver
Programs
A. Work Requirements
As part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 40
Congress expanded Medicaid eligibility to include adults under
sixty-five years old whose income did not exceed 138 percent of
the federal poverty line. 41 In 2012, the United States Supreme
37. See id. (noting that the Trump Administration continued approving
“eligibility- and enrollment-related waiver provisions” approved by the Obama
Administration).
38. See Bolton, supra note 29, at 100–02 (stating that historically courts
have been “unwilling to limit the scope of the Secretary’s power to approve
waivers”).
39. Mothers and Children Last, supra note 29, at 111 (emphasizing that
courts will not interfere so long as the Secretary has made legitimate findings
and followed the appropriate processes). See C.K. v. N.J. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 183 (3d Cir. 1996) (viewing the Secretary’s
consideration of relevant factors in approving the Section 1115 waiver at issue
and compilation of a robust record to be sufficient as a valid exercise of the
Secretary’s powers); Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1106–07 (2d Cir.
1973) (stating that the Secretary need only review sufficient materials to
decide whether the Section 1115 program is “likely” to promote the objectives
of Medicaid). But see Greater N.Y. Hosp. Assoc. v. Blum, 476 F. Supp. 234, 243
(E.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding that the Secretary’s approval of the Section 1115
program approved the waiver of a provision of the Medicaid Act which the
Secretary, under § 1315, was not permitted to waive); Cuello, supra note 19,
at 892 (arguing that Section 1115 grants HHS only narrow authority and does
not permit the type of broad programs currently seen).
40. Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2018) (providing for Medicaid
expansion starting in 2014).
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Court ruled that Medicaid expansion was optional for states to
participate in, rather than mandatory. 42 Although many states
have still not expanded Medicaid, 43 several conservative states
have used Section 1115 waivers to expand Medicaid eligibility
to certain populations while implementing conservative
reforms. 44
Within the past four years, many states requested and
received approval for Section 1115 waiver programs that
include work requirements for able-bodied Medicaid
recipients. 45 Although this work requirement policy was
proposed in the past, 46 previous administrations refused to
approve such waivers. 47 The Trump Administration signaled its
42. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 587 (2012)
(stating that states may voluntarily sign up to participate in Medicaid
expansion, but that the federal government cannot force the states to accept
expansion).
43. See Status of State Action on Medicaid Expansion Decision, KAISER
FAM. FOUND., https://perma.cc/G4SX-WWP9 (stating that 14 states have not
expanded Medicaid at the time of this writing).
44. See Andrew Prokop, The Battle Over Medicaid Expansion in 2013 and
2014, Explained, VOX, https://perma.cc/YFL3-VQYP (last updated May 12,
2015) (detailing the conservative states that requested Section 1115 waivers
to implement conservative reforms to their respective Medicaid programs).
45. See Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Approved and Pending Section 1115
Waivers by State, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://perma.cc/54F8-9MMQ (stating
that the states with Medicaid work requirements are Arkansas, Indiana,
Kentucky, and New Hampshire).
46. See
Laura
Hermer,
What
to
Expect
When
You’re
Expecting . . . TANF-Style Medicaid Waivers, 27 ANN. HEALTH L. 37, 37–38
(2018) [hereinafter What to Expect] (providing examples of previously
suggested work requirement policies to combat negative stereotypes about the
typical Medicaid recipient); see also IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., HIP 2.0
SECTION 1115 WAIVER APPLICATION (2014), https://perma.cc/GU7Z-3SAH
(PDF) (proposing a Section 1115 waiver to the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) that would require certain subpopulations of
Medicaid beneficiaries to work a certain number of hours in order to receive
their benefits).
47. See Letter from Vikki Wachino, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs.,
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Jeffrey A. Meyers, Comm’r, N.H.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Nov. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/E4S5-8BR2
(PDF) (explaining that CMS will not approve demonstration projects that
include work requirements because such requirements do not further the
objectives of the Medicaid Act); Jessica Greene, What Medicaid Recipients and
Other Low-Income Adults Think About Medicaid Work Requirements, HEALTH
AFF. (Aug. 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/44DB-KS7F?type=image (stating that
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amenability to approving Section 1115 waivers that
implemented work requirements in state Medicaid programs,
and the Administration even solicited such waiver proposals. 48
Medicaid work requirements generally apply to able-bodied
adults within the Medicaid expansion population 49 and require
beneficiaries to verify their participation in activities such as
“employment, job search, or job training programs, for a certain
number of hours per week.” 50 Many legal scholars believe that
work requirements do not further the objectives of the Medicaid
Act because they are not directly related to providing medical
assistance to people. 51 The reporting requirements for work
requirements are often difficult for Medicaid beneficiaries to
meet due to lack of access to technology or difficulty
understanding technology. 52 Failure to properly comply with the
the Obama Administration did not approve work requirements because they
threatened access to medical care).
48. See Letter from Brian Neale, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs.,
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to State Medicaid Dirs., SMD No. 18-002
(Jan. 11, 2018) (Re: Opportunities to Promote Work and Community
Engagement Among Medicaid Beneficiaries), https://perma.cc/HMT3-RB5J
(PDF) (explaining that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
will now support state efforts to attach a work requirement to receipt of
Medicaid benefits pursuant to a Section 1115 waiver, signaling a reversal in
policy from previous administrations who would deny such requirements).
49. See Joy Madubuonwu et al., Work Requirements in Kentucky
Medicaid: A Policy in Limbo, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Sept. 27, 2019), https://
perma.cc/CU6X-5WJL (stating that the work requirements portion of
Kentucky HEALTH would apply to only nonelderly, non-disabled adults which
is the typical population covered by Medicaid expansion).
50. Rachel Garfield et al., Understanding the Intersection of Medicaid
and Work: What Does the Data Say?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 8, 2019),
https://perma.cc/W6ZM-6C94.
51. See Sara Rosenbaum, Invented Purposes and Blue Sky Predictions:
Why the Trump Administration Cannot Win the Medicaid Work Experiment
Cases, 29 HEALTH MATRIX 113, 118 (2019) [hereinafter Invented Purposes]
(highlighting that Section 1115 demonstrations are confined to those projects
which are likely to promote the objectives of the Medicaid Act); Sidney D.
Watson, Medicaid, Work, and the Courts: Reigning in HHS Overreach, 46 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 887, 888 (2018) (arguing that the core objective of Medicaid is
to “provide health insurance for those who qualify for it” and that work
requirements reduce coverage for many beneficiaries).
52. See Garfield et al., supra note 50 (“Many Medicaid enrollees face
barriers to work such as functional disabilities, serious medical conditions,
school attendance, and care-taking responsibilities. Many Medicaid adults do
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reporting requirements could cause beneficiaries to lose their
Medicaid coverage, even though 63 percent of nonelderly adults
on Medicaid are already working. 53 The Secretary’s approval of
Section 1115 work requirement waivers triggered immediate
litigation from Medicaid beneficiaries alleging unlawful
approval. 54
B. Block Grants
Conservative proposals to reform America’s health care
system often include changing the Medicaid funding structure
from the current open-ended funding to block grants. 55 Block
grants use a capped spending model where the federal
government grants a lump sum of money to a state for a specific
program and vests control and oversight of the program in the
state rather than the federal government. 56 Other welfare
programs use federal block grants, such as the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. 57 Congress
created the TANF block grant in 1996 to provide states with a
not use computers, the internet or email, which could be a barrier in finding a
job or complying with policies to report work or exemption status.”).
53. See id. (“Most Medicaid adults are already working; among those who
are not working, most report barriers to work.”).
54. Brief for Petitioner at 1, Rose v. Azar, No. 1:19-cv-02848 (D.D.C. Sept.
23, 2019). See Philbrick v. Azar, No. 19-773, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125675, at
*5 (D.D.C. Jul. 29, 2019) (stating that the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, in approving this Section 1115 waiver, failed to consider the relevant
factors as required by the APA); Gresham v. Azar, 363 F. Supp. 3d 165, 169
(D.D.C. 2019) (same); Stewart v. Azar, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 135–36 (D.D.C.
2019) (same).
55. See Vikki Wachino & Tim Gronniger, The Insufficiency of Medicaid
Block Grants: The Example of Puerto Rico, HEALTH AFF. (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://perma.cc/P5X9-63T5?type=image (“Medicaid block grants have been a
centerpiece of Republican health proposals for more than a decade.”); see also
Shefali Luthra, Everything You Need to Know About Block Grants – The Heart
of GOP’s Medicaid Plans, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 24, 2017), https://
perma.cc/V7RV-UKZA (finding that Republican proposals to change Medicaid
to a block grant program date back to the Reagan Administration).
56. See Sachs & Huberfeld, supra note 10 (“A block grant scheme would
be very different from Medicaid’s statutorily required open-ended funding.”);
Luthra, supra note 55 (stating that a Medicaid block grant scheme would
involve “turning control of the program to states and capping what the federal
government spends on it each year”).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 603 (2018).
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greater degree of independence and flexibility in spending
federal dollars. 58 However, many states have used the flexibility
over TANF funds to shift the money to other parts of the state
budget that do not directly help poor families. 59 Further,
TANF’s block grant structure does not account for inflation,
resulting in TANF having lost “one-third of its value since
1997.” 60 Another federal program that receives its funding
through block grants is the Children’s Health Insurance
Program (CHIP). 61 Congress must renew CHIP’s block grant
every five years, leading to ongoing difficulties in ensuring the
block grant is reauthorized in a timely manner. 62 Further,
states often spend in excess of their allotted block grant portion,
requiring additional federal funding to provide consistent
coverage. 63
For Medicaid specifically, a block grant program could take
several forms, including states receiving a pre-determined
amount of money from the federal government, or states
receiving a sum of money based on the number of Medicaid

58. See What to Expect, supra note 46, at 42–43 (“[S]tates also maintain
considerable discretion to decide how to spend their block grants, whether on
cash welfare to TANF recipients, work and training support, marriage
promotion activities, child protective services, or otherwise.”).
59. See LIZ SCHOTT ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, HOW
STATES USE FEDERAL AND STATE FUNDS UNDER THE TANF BLOCK GRANT 1
(2015), https://perma.cc/Z98Q-MGQ4 (PDF) (“TANF’s combination of broadly
defined purposes and limited accountability for much of its spending has
enabled states to divert funds from supporting the poorest families and use
them instead to help fill state budget holes.”).
60. Id.
61. § 1397aa.
62. See Laura Hermer, Hot Topics in Healthcare Compliance: Engage
with Leaders: Medicaid: Welfare Program of Last Resort, or Safety Net?, 44
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1203, 1216 (2018) (noting that CHIP faces struggles in
“winning congressional reauthorization”); see also Sarah Kliff, CHIP is Finally
Getting Funded–After 114 Days Without a Budget, VOX (Jan. 22, 2018), https://
perma.cc/X8AM-LNBF (“Congress let CHIP’s long-term funding lapse 114
days ago.”).
63. See Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
431, 472 (2011) (noting that many states struggle with budgeting and
spending block grant money appropriately).

110

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 97 (2020)

beneficiaries in that state. 64 Under either model, the state would
also gain greater control over the Medicaid program. 65
In early 2020, the Trump Administration released guidance
from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
indicating that the federal government is willing to receive
Section 1115 waivers requesting Medicaid as a block grant. 66
This initiative, called the Healthy Adult Opportunity (HAO),
would allow states to receive a lump sum of money to cover the
Medicaid expansion population and other non-disabled adults. 67
States would choose whether to receive the money under a per
capita annual federal spending cap, calculated on the number of
Medicaid enrollees multiplied by the “maximum allowable
spending per person,” or an aggregate annual federal spending
cap, which would apply to the state regardless of fluctuations in
Medicaid enrollment. 68 The block grant would require less
federal oversight and provide states with the ability to limit
available benefits as well as impose cost-sharing mechanisms
on beneficiaries. 69 Health law experts predict that any proposals
under the HAO initiative would face a “pretty quick litigation
response” since the initiative likely violates the Medicaid Act. 70

64. See Sachs & Huberfeld, supra note 10 (describing the potential
structure of a Medicaid block grant).
65. See Eliot Fishman & Joe Weissfeld, Medicaid Policy and Partisan
Politics: A New Dynamic, HEALTH AFF. (Oct. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/J88K9R9Z/?type=image (using Tennessee as an example of a state asking for
Medicaid as a block grant with minimal federal oversight on spending).
66. See Lynch, supra note 14 (encouraging states to apply for Medicaid
as a block grant through Section 1115 waivers).
67. See id. (discussing the structure of the Healthy Adult Opportunity
initiative).
68. See Robin Rudowitz et al., Implications of CMS’s New “Healthy Adult
Opportunity” Demonstrations for Medicaid, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 5,
2020), https://perma.cc/25ZW-9GSG [hereinafter Implications] (detailing the
difference in the two spending cap options available to states under HAO).
69. See id. (stating that this new initiative would be a change from past
Medicaid proposals due to relaxing coverage requirements and federal
oversight).
70. See Shira Stein, Medicaid Block Grant Policy Could Face High Legal
Hurdles, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/LJ2H-7QZU (stating
that the Healthy Adult Opportunity initiative is trying to waive many
unwaivable parts of the Medicaid Act).
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Congress intended for Section 1115 waivers to test
innovations in Medicaid delivery. 71 However, changing
Medicaid funding to a block grant would represent a marked
departure from past Medicaid proposals despite Section 1115’s
innovative nature. 72 While Section 1115 permits the Secretary
to waive compliance with several parts of the Medicaid Act, 73
the Secretary cannot waive Section 1903, as would be required
for a successful block grant demonstration. 74 Section 1903
delineates the funding structure of Medicaid, including the
required unlimited federal matching system. 75 Many legal
scholars argue that shifting Medicaid to a block grant program
would raise similar arguments as the work requirements
litigation because both programs violate the Medicaid Act. 76 As
the first Section 1115 block grant proposal to move to the final
round of approval by the CMS, Amendment 42 serves as test
case for these block grant proposals. 77
71. See Sachs & Huberfeld, supra note 10 (identifying Section 1115
waivers as the most likely way for the government to experiment with
providing Medicaid as a block grant).
72. See Implications, supra note 68 (characterizing the Trump
Administration’s chosen policy changes to Medicaid, such as block grants, as
marking a “new direction for Medicaid demonstrations”).
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2018) (listing the specific provisions in the
Medicaid Act that the Secretary may waive in approving a Section 1115
demonstration project).
74. Id. § 1396b.
75. See id. (discussing the payment system to states); see also Sachs &
Huberfeld, supra note 10 (hypothesizing that the non-waivable nature of
Section 1903 presents a death knell to block grants).
76. See Sara Rosenbaum, What a Medicaid Block Grant Would Mean for
Tennessee: An Update, COMMONWEALTH FUND (May 30, 2019), https://perma.cc
/GE6T-ARX2 (last updated Sept. 25, 2019) [hereinafter An Update]
(hypothesizing that, if the Secretary were to approve a block grant waiver,
many of the litigation strategies would mirror those of the work requirements
cases); Sachs & Huberfeld, supra note 10 (arguing that changing Medicaid to
block grants is unlawful because it violates the language of Section 1115);
Nicholas Bagley, Tennessee Wants to Block Grant Medicaid. Is That Legal?,
THE INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST, (Sept. 17, 2019, 3:30 PM), https://perma.cc/EJD4GTC6 (doubting the ability of states to use Section 1115 waivers to alter
Medicaid’s financing structure).
77. See Letter from Andrea J. Cash, Dir., Div. of Coverage & Expansion
Demonstrations, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to John G. Roberts,
Comm’r, Div. of TennCare, Tenn. State Gov’t (Nov. 26, 2019), https://perma.cc
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C. Comparing Amendment 42 with the Healthy Adult
Opportunity Program

The Tennessee government wrote Amendment 42 in the
context of the current leadership of Health and Human Services
(HHS) and CMS. 78 Since taking control in 2017, the Trump
Administration has signaled that HHS and CMS are amenable
to Section 1115 waiver proposals that previously would not have
been approved. 79 Part of this shift is the Administration’s desire
to give more power over the Medicaid program to the states,
rather than consolidating that power in CMS. 80 Thus,
Tennessee proposed a Medicaid program in which the state
would receive Medicaid funding in the form of a block grant. 81
Additionally, Tennessee’s state legislature passed a bill
requiring the state’s Medicaid agency to submit a proposal to
CMS asking to receive its Medicaid funds as a block grant. 82
/88H6-LGPN (PDF) (indicating that Tennessee’s Amendment 42 proposal met
the requirements for a Section 1115 demonstration project submission and
would move to the next phase in obtaining CMS approval); see also Brett
Kelman & Joel Ebert, TennCare and the Trump Administration Have
Drastically Different Block Grant Plans, TENNESSEAN (Jan. 30, 2020), https://
perma.cc/QM22-ZAVQ (highlighting that Tennessee is the first state to ask
CMS for a block grant for the state’s Medicaid funding).
78. See TENN. DIV. OF TENNCARE, supra note 4, at iii (stating Tennessee’s
rationale for moving to a block grant system); see also Stephanie Armour,
Tennessee Becomes First State to Embrace Block Grants for Medicaid Funding,
WALL ST. J., https://perma.cc/7RMJ-JHNT (last updated May 7, 2019, 2:46
PM) (noting that Tennessee is seeking approval from HHS and CMS of its
Section 1115 waiver to convert the state’s Medicaid program to a block grant).
79. See Neale, supra note 48 (explaining that CMS will now support state
efforts to attach a work requirement to receipt of Medicaid benefits pursuant
to a Section 1115 waiver, signaling a reversal in policy from previous
administrations who would deny such requirements).
80. See id. (“Each state is different, and states are in the best position to
determine which approaches are most likely to succeed, based on their specific
populations and resources.”).
81. See TENN. DIV. OF TENNCARE, supra note 4, at iii (discussing the
reasons Tennessee feels Amendment 42 serves the best interests of the state).
But see Sara Rosenbaum et al., Inside Tennessee’s Final 1115 Medicaid Block
Grant Proposal, HEALTH AFF. (Dec. 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/B7X2NTFU?type=image (“According to the Nashville Tennessean, the original
proposal drew over 1800 public comments, 11 of them positive.”).
82. See Letter from John G. Roberts, Comm’r, Div. of TennCare, Tenn.
State Gov’t, to Randy McNally, Lieutenant Governor & Speaker of the Senate,
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Specifically, the proposed amendment explicitly requests to
change Tennessee’s Medicaid program into a block grant. 83
Tennessee wishes to pursue this change because of freedom
from federal oversight afforded to the state through a block
grant. 84 The proposal pushes for broad state authority over
benefit reduction and expansion, 85 exemption from any
potential future federal mandates regarding Medicaid coverage,
86 the ability to spend (or not spend) any expenditure as the state
wishes, 87 and exemption from federal oversight processes,
including federal review of the demonstration. 88 Critics note the
proposal is “long on generalized arguments and rhetorical
positioning and short on detail.” 89 Although legal advocacy
organizations asked CMS to refrain from approving
Amendment 42 until Tennessee provided more detail, 90 CMS
Tenn. Gen. Assembly, & Cameron Sexton, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Tenn. Gen. Assembly, (Sept. 17, 2019) (Re: TennCare
Amendment 42 Submission), https://perma.cc/4SGF-KRLJ (PDF) (“In 2019,
the Tennessee General Assembly enacted Public Chapter No. 481, directing
TennCare to submit a waiver amendment to CMS to provide medical
assistance to the TennCare population by means of a block grant.”).
83. See TENN. DIV. OF TENNCARE, supra note 4, at 4 (“The proposed
demonstration will transform the traditional Medicaid financing structure in
Tennessee to a block grant.”).
84. See id. at 13 (explaining Tennessee’s reasoning for making this
request to the federal government).
85. See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 81 (“[T]he state continues to
position itself to reduce coverage within any benefit category.”).
86. See id. (“[T]he state continues to seek exemption from ‘any new
federal mandates over the life of the demonstration that could have a material
impact on the state’s Medicaid expenditures’ offering examples such as
mandated eligibility and benefit expansions.”).
87. See id. (stating that non-expenditure of federal program surpluses
can be an issue).
88. See id. (“The state also . . . seeks extensive waivers of the federal
oversight process, including approval of managed care contracts, state
arrangements with MCOs on delivery system reforms, limits on risk
contracting, and federal certification of actuarially sound capitation rates.”).
89. Id. For the state’s perspective on this point, see TENN. DIV. OF
TENNCARE, supra note 4, at 13 (stating that the state will not “enumerate in
detail in this document every innovation, reform, or policy change that might
take place over the life of the demonstration, since the purpose of the block
grant is precisely to give the state a range of autonomy . . . .”).
90. See Letter from Jane Perkins, Legal Dir., Nat’l Health Law Program,
to Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Nov. 26, 2019)
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issued a letter stating that Tennessee’s new Section 1115 waiver
was in the final stages of approval. 91
Amendment 42 differs from the HAO program in that the
programs
target
different
populations
of
Medicaid
beneficiaries. 92 Amendment 42 would impact the entire
Medicaid beneficiary population in Tennessee, while the HAO
program would focus only on the Medicaid expansion population
of healthy, non-disabled adults. 93 The Medicaid expansion
population consists of childless adults aged 19–64 with incomes
under 138 percent of the federal poverty line who generally do
not have a complex medical condition or disability that would
otherwise make them eligible for Medicaid. 94 In contrast,
Amendment 42 would impact all 1.6 million people enrolled in
Tennessee’s Medicaid program, including children with special
needs, nursing home residents, and people with intellectual and
developmental disabilities. 95 Thus, Amendment 42 would have
a much wider impact on low-income and disabled individuals
requiring medical assistance than the HAO program would
have on the expansion population. 96 Since Tennessee has not
(Re: TennCare II Demonstration), https://perma.cc/8WHE-J8EF (PDF) (“[W]e
ask that CMS not issue a letter of completeness until the State submits a
waiver application with sufficient content and specificity to allow for
meaningful public review and comment.”).
91. See Cash, supra note 77 (indicating that Tennessee’s Amendment 42
proposal met the requirements for a Section 1115 demonstration project
submission and would move to the next phase in obtaining CMS approval).
92. See Kelman & Ebert, supra note 77 (stating that the Healthy Adult
Opportunity initiative has a much narrower focus than Amendment 42).
93. See id. (“TennCare and the federal government have dramatically
different visions for how block grants can be used to transform Medicaid
programs. Both visions would cap funding in exchange for giving states more
authority over Medicaid, but the people who would be affected are not the
same.”).
94. See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Medicaid Matters: Crafting a
Narrative for the Red State Option, 102 KY. L.J. 381, 394 (2013) (discussing
the demographics of the Medicaid expansion population as generally
low-income, working adults).
95. See Medicaid’s Role in Tennessee, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jul. 21, 2017),
https://perma.cc/WS6T-DQUN (discussing the demographics that make up
Tennessee’s Medicaid population).
96. See Kelman & Ebert, supra note 77 (noting the differences in the
populations affected by Amendment 42 and the Healthy Adult Opportunity
program).
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chosen to expand Medicaid, the HAO program would have
limited reach in the state. 97
IV. Recent Case Law on Section 1115 Waiver Programs
Before approving Medicaid block grants, the federal
government should carefully evaluate whether such programs
satisfy the objectives of the Medicaid Act or comply with the
APA. 98 As mentioned earlier, Section 1115 litigation looks to
whether the program in question advances the objectives of the
Medicaid Act and thus whether the Secretary was justified in
his approval. 99 The fundamental requirement that Section 1115
waivers promote the objectives of the Medicaid Act applies to all
types of waiver programs, making the courts’ reasoning in the
work requirements cases instructive to future block grant
cases. 100
In 2018, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia issued its first full Section 1115 waiver opinion in
Stewart v. Azar 101 (Stewart I) in which the district court vacated
the Secretary’s approval of Kentucky HEALTH. 102 After
providing the Secretary with the opportunity to reconsider his
approval of Kentucky’s Section 1115 waiver, the district court
again struck down the Secretary’s approval of the work
requirements waiver in 2019 in Stewart II. 103 On the same day,
the district court issued another Section 1115 work
requirements decision in Gresham v. Azar 104 (Gresham I) where
97. See id. (stating that Tennessee has not expanded Medicaid).
98. See An Update, supra note 76 (hypothesizing that any legal challenge
to block grants would likely follow the same formula as the legal challenges to
work requirements).
99. See supra Part I.
100. See An Update, supra note 76 (discussing the similarities between the
Section 1115 waivers for work requirements and a Section 1115 waiver for
block grants).
101. 313 F. Supp. 3d 237 (D.D.C. 2018).
102. See id. at 273 (finding that the Secretary’s failure to consider the
effect of Kentucky HEALTH on providing medical coverage voided the
Secretary’s approval).
103. See Stewart v. Azar (Stewart II), 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 130–31 (D.D.C.
2019) (discussing the procedural history of this case since the Secretary
approved Kentucky’s Section 1115 waiver in 2018).
104. 363 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2019).
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the court relied on its reasoning in both Stewart I and Stewart
II to strike down Arkansas’s Section 1115 work requirement
waiver. 105 In early 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit unanimously affirmed the
district court’s rulings in the Section 1115 work requirements
cases in Gresham v. Azar (Gresham II). 106
A. Stewart v. Azar
In 2016, Kentucky sought approval from CMS for the first
Section 1115 demonstration project that would impose work
requirements on able-bodied Medicaid beneficiaries, titled
Kentucky HEALTH. 107 Since Kentucky received approval,
seventeen other states, including Arkansas, have filed Section
1115 waivers seeking to incorporate work requirements into
their Medicaid programs. 108 The Secretary’s approval of these
Section 1115 demonstration projects prompted Medicaid
beneficiaries in Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, and New
Hampshire to file suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia against the federal government for
bypassing “the legislative process and act[ing] unilaterally to
fundamentally transform Medicaid” as well as for violation of
the APA. 109
In 2018, sixteen Kentucky Medicaid beneficiaries brought
suit against HHS and CMS for allegedly violating the APA by
105. See id. at 172–73 (discussing the role of the Kentucky cases in the
court’s decision striking down the Arkansas work requirements).
106. See Gresham v. Azar (Gresham II), 950 F.3d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(agreeing with the district court that the Secretary’s approval of the Section
1115 work requirements waivers was arbitrary and capricious).
107. See Letter from Matthew Bevin, Gov., Ky., to Sylvia Burwell, Sec’y,
Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. (Aug. 24, 2016), https://perma.cc/JTV3-6CL7
(PDF) (requesting approval from HHS for the Section 1115 demonstration
project).
108. See Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Approved and Pending Section 1115
Waivers by State, supra note 45 (detailing the number of Section 1115 waivers
by topic).
109. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 54, at 1; see Philbrick v. Azar, No.
19-773, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125675, at *5 (D.D.C. Jul. 29, 2019) (stating
that the Secretary of Health and Human Services, in approving this Section
1115 waiver, failed to consider the relevant factors as required by the APA);
Gresham I, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 169 (same); Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at
135– 36 (same).
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approving Kentucky’s Section 1115 waiver imposing work
requirements on the Medicaid population. 110 Initially, the
district court issued an opinion denying the federal
government’s request to transfer the suit to the Eastern District
of Kentucky. 111 A few months later, the district court issued an
opinion denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment and
remanded the issue back to HHS for an additional
notice-and-comment period. 112 Finally, the district court heard
the case again after the Secretary approved Kentucky’s Section
1115 program a second time. 113
In striking down Kentucky’s Section 1115 program, the
district court evaluated two arguments: one, that the Secretary
violated the Medicaid Act by improperly approving Kentucky’s
program; and two, the Secretary’s approval of Kentucky’s
program violated the APA because the Secretary acted in a way
that was arbitrary and capricious. 114
1. The Medicaid Act
The objective of the Medicaid Act is to provide medical
assistance to people “whose income and resources are
insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services.” 115
110. See Stewart v. Azar, 308 F. Supp. 3d 239, 242 (D.D.C. 2018)
(discussing the factual background of the case).
111. See id. at 250 (denying the defendants’ request to transfer the case to
Kentucky district court).
112. See Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 272–74 (D.D.C. 2018) (discussing
the appropriate remedy in this scenario as remanding back to the agency for
continued deliberation).
113. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 131 (“Plaintiffs now challenge the
reapproval, contending principally that the Secretary has not remedied the
defects that rendered his prior action unlawful. Specifically, they maintain
that he has still not adequately considered Kentucky HEALTH’s likelihood to
cause significant coverage loss.”).
114. See id. at 135 (discussing two of the arguments that plaintiffs make
against defendants’ actions); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (stating that arbitrary and
capricious action occurs when “the agency entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem [or] offered an explanation for its decision
that runs counter to the evidence before the agency”).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2018). See Covenant Health Sys. v. Sebelius, 820
F. Supp. 2d 4, 9–10 (D.D.C. 2011) (“According to the Medicaid statute, ‘medical
assistance’ is ‘payment of part or all of the cost’ of medical ‘care and services’
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The court in Stewart II stated that courts define medical
assistance as “payment in part or all of the costs of medical care
and services for a defined set of individuals.” 116 During oral
arguments for Stewart II, the federal government conceded that
this objective of Medicaid applies equally to the expansion
population. 117
The Medicaid Act requires that the Secretary only approve
demonstration projects that support the objectives of the
Medicaid Act. 118 The statute thus makes clear that the
responsibility is on the Secretary to exercise his or her best
judgment on whether the proposed project is likely to promote
the objectives of Medicaid. 119
In Stewart II, the Secretary argued that there are three
main objectives of the Medicaid Act in addition to providing
medical assistance to the needy: 1) promoting health, 2)
financial independence, and 3) fiscal sustainability. 120 The
district court evaluated each of these purported objectives in

for a defined set of individuals.’ This defined group of individuals consists of
patients who fall within one of thirteen categories of individuals to whom
states may (or must) extend Medicaid benefits.”).
116. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 135 (D.D.C. 2019) (quoting Adena
Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Leavitt, 527 F.3d 176, 180 (D.C. Cir. 2008)) (providing the
statutory definition of medical assistance); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 301 (1980) (“The Medicaid program was created . . . for the purpose of
providing federal financial assistance to States that choose to reimburse
certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons.”).
117. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 138–39 (referencing the federal
government’s agreement that the purposes of Medicaid apply to the expansion
population in question in Kentucky).
118. See § 1315 (discussing the requirements for the Secretary’s approval
of demonstration projects); see also Invented Purposes, supra note 51, at
115–16 (examining Stewart with an emphasis on the purpose of the Medicaid
Act).
119. See § 1315 (stating that the Secretary has final approval of each
demonstration project).
120. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 139 (discussing the Secretary’s
inclusion of more than the single objective of the Medicaid Act); see also Letter
from Paul Mango, Chief Principal Deputy Administrator, Ctrs. for Medicare
& Medicaid Servs., to Carol H. Steckel, Commissioner, Ky. Dep’t for Medicaid
Servs., (Nov. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/M6CF-MZFZ (PDF) (discussing
CMS’s position on the objectives of the Medicaid program in light of the earlier
Stewart cases).
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turn, starting with the objective of furnishing medical
assistance. 121
a. Furnishing Medical Assistance
The court found that the objective of furnishing medical
assistance had two elements: “whether the project would cause
recipients to lose coverage” and “whether the project would help
promote coverage.” 122 In order to be “legally adequate,” the
Secretary’s approval of a Section 1115 waiver program must
include an adequate analysis of the effect of the program on
Medicaid coverage. 123 The district court did not propose a
bright-line test for satisfying these two elements but rather
suggested that a court would need to employ a more fact-specific
determination when evaluating whether the Secretary has
satisfied these elements. 124 The Secretary is not required to
know the exact number of Medicaid beneficiaries who will be
affected by the Secretary’s approval of the program. 125 In terms
of coverage promotion, the district court looked for evidence that
the Secretary had weighed the Section 1115 waiver program’s

121. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 139 (stating that the district court
will examine each of the Secretary’s assertions that the three added objectives
of the Medicaid Act are valid and can be used to justify approval of Kentucky
HEALTH).
122. See id. at 140 (quoting Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 262 (D.D.C.
2018)) (restating the district court’s findings from the previous proceeding
about the elements of the first objective of the Medicaid Act).
123. See id. (suggesting that the Secretary is required to provide a
numerical estimate of how many people would lose their Medicaid coverage as
a result of the Section 1115 waiver program); see also Am. Wild Horse Pres.
Campaign v. Perdue, 873 F.3d 914, 932 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (providing another
instance where the court looked for a Secretary’s adequate analysis when
changing course in an agency’s decision-making).
124. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 140 (focusing on the specific number
of beneficiaries enrolled in Kentucky’s Medicaid program that would be
affected by Kentucky HEALTH to determine the outcome of the coverage
elements).
125. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 141 (“As the D.C. Circuit
acknowledged when a petitioner challenged the potential imprecision of an
agency’s numbers, even “in the best of circumstances,” the agency “has no
access to infallible data.” (quoting Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 597 F.3d
1306, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2010))).
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coverage promotion against the quantified coverage loss. 126 The
district court evaluated the Secretary’s actions against these
two elements of furnishing medical assistance. 127
b. Promoting Beneficiary Health
Upon reapproval of Kentucky HEALTH, the Secretary
argued that promoting health was a standalone objective of the
Medicaid program. 128 The district court applied the Chevron 129
two-step analysis to the Secretary’s interpretation of health as
an objective of the Medicaid Act. 130 The district court concluded
that the Secretary’s inclusion of health as an objective “fails at
step two [of the Chevron analysis] because it falls outside ‘the

126. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 143 (“In light of the failure to weigh
any coverage promotion in the face of the likelihood of substantial coverage
loss, the Secretary did not ‘adequately analyze the . . . consequences’ of the
[waiver] reapproval.”).
127. See id. at 139 (discussing the Secretary’s actions in light of the
Medicaid objective of furnishing medical assistance).
128. See Mango, supra note 120 (“But there is little intrinsic value in
paying for [Medicaid] services if those services are not advancing the health
and wellness of the individual receiving them.”); see also Stewart I, 313 F.
Supp. 3d 237, 262 (D.D.C. 2018) (discussing the Secretary’s argument that
health promotion is a core objective of the Medicaid Act).
129. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
130. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 144 (D.D.C. 2019) (finding that
the court must apply the Chevron test to the Secretary’s articulation of
Medicaid’s objectives); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (providing the
standard by which agency interpretation of a statute is measured)
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which
it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is
the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the
court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of
an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.
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bounds of reasonableness.’” 131 To make this determination, the
district court looked to Congress’s intent behind enacting the
Medicaid Act as well as the Affordable Care Act to decide that
the Secretary’s addition of “health” to the objectives of Medicaid
was erroneous, finding that Congress and the Affordable Care
Act sought to make health care more affordable for needy
populations. 132 The Secretary’s broadening of the Medicaid Act
objectives to include “health” was impermissible. 133
c. Promoting Beneficiary Financial Independence
The district court addressed the Secretary’s contention that
another objective of the Medicaid Act was granting Medicaid
beneficiaries greater understanding of financial independence
in a similar manner as the Secretary’s other arguments. 134
Applying Chevron, the district court found that the Secretary’s
assertion that financial independence is part of furnishing
medical assistance was an unreasonable reading of Section
1115. 135 It is necessary for an agency to ground its
interpretation of objectives of congressional acts in a statutory

131. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 144 (“[T]he Court cannot sustain
the Secretary’s generalization of health from the Act’s objective of furnishing
medical care.” (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 988 (D.C. Cir.
1990))).
132. See id. (looking to Congressional intent behind enactment of the
Medicaid Act and Affordable Care Act); see also Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at
267 (D.D.C. 2018) (“[Congress] . . . had an interest in making health care more
affordable for such people.”).
133. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 144 (“The Secretary is not free
instead to extrapolate the objectives of the statute to a higher level of
generality and pursue that aim in the way he prefers.”).
134. See id. at 145 (discussing the Secretary’s inclusion of promoting
beneficiary financial independence as a Medicaid objective).
135. See id. at 146 (“As the Court found before, financial self-sufficiency is
not an independent objective of the Act and, as such, cannot undergird the
Secretary’s finding under [Section 1115] that the project promotes the Act’s
goals.”); see also Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“The
‘reasonableness’ of an agency’s construction depends,” in part, “on the
construction’s ‘fit’ with the statutory language, as well as its conformity to
statutory purposes.” (quoting Abbott Labs v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 988 (D.C.
Cir. 1990))).
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basis. 136 The state whose population is affected by the
Secretary’s approval of a program may offer justifications for an
agency’s approval of a program, but if the Secretary does not
specifically rely on those assertions when approving the
program, the state’s argument does not carry weight in the
court’s consideration. 137 Specifically in the Medicaid context, the
agency is still obligated to weigh the potential costs of Medicaid
coverage against the benefits of promoting the financial
independence of beneficiaries. 138
d. Ensuring Fiscal Sustainability of the Medicaid Program
In approving Kentucky’s Section 1115 waiver, the Secretary
stated that such demonstration projects give states a way to
experiment with policies that “ensure the fiscal sustainability of
the Medicaid program,” which then enables the state to provide
medical assistance to a wider range of populations. 139 The
Secretary reasoned that approving Kentucky HEALTH saved
Kentucky money in the long-term, and therefore provided the
state with the ability to offer Medicaid coverage to a larger
population of people. 140 The district court analyzed the
Secretary’s argument about fiscal sustainability as both an

136. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 146 (stating that an agency “must
employ the means Congress prescribed to tackle the problem it identified” in
an act or program).
137. See id. at 146 (acknowledging the Commonwealth of Kentucky’s
argument in favor of finding that financial independence is part of Medicaid’s
objectives, but noting that the Secretary did not rely on these arguments in
approving Kentucky’s Section 1115 waiver program).
138. See id. at 148 (noting that the Secretary failed to weigh the costs of
Kentucky HEALTH against the potential benefits in increasing beneficiary
financial independence).
139. See Mango, supra note 120 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2018)) (finding
that fiscal sustainability of the Medicaid program in general can be considered
an objective of the Medicaid Act.
140. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 148 (discussing the Secretary’s
argument that fiscal sustainability is a key component of the Medicaid Act
because it enables states such as Kentucky to provide Medicaid coverage to
expansion populations).
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independent objective of Medicaid as well as a sub-objective of
Medicaid coverage promotion. 141
(1) Fiscal Sustainability as an Independent Objective of the
Medicaid Program
Chevron deference is granted any time an agency interprets
the objectives of a statute which the agency is charged with
executing. 142 The district court found that the word “objectives”
as used in the text of the law was ambiguous, so the court moved
to step two of the Chevron analysis. 143 The district court looked
to the statutory language to determine whether the Secretary’s
interpretation of “objectives” was reasonable and concluded that
the Secretary’s interpretation was permissible. 144
In addition to satisfying the Chevron test, however, the
agency must also justify why approval of the particular Section
1115 waiver program will advance the objective of fiscal
sustainability and its potential adverse effect on the other
objectives of Medicaid. 145 The district court pointed to the
Secretary’s lack of substantial evidence that Kentucky
HEALTH would improve the fiscal sustainability of Medicaid. 146
Without this type of evidence, the Secretary’s approval of such

141. See id. (stating that the Secretary did not specify whether he saw
fiscal sustainability as its own objective of the Medicaid program or as falling
under the umbrella of another objective of the Medicaid program).
142. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)
(describing the appropriate two-step analysis for courts when evaluating
agency interpretation of statutes).
143. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 149 (D.D.C. 2019) (stating that
the Secretary satisfied the requirement that the word “objectives” in the
statute is ambiguous).
144. See id. (finding that the word “practicable” in § 1396-1 is “at least a
qualifier of the extent to which states must furnish medical assistance”); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2018) (using the phrase “as far as practicable under
the conditions in such State” to qualify the requirement that states must
furnish medical assistance to needy populations).
145. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 149 (reiterating that the Secretary
cannot simply satisfy the Chevron test but must look closely at the effect of
approving a particular Section 1115 waiver).
146. See id. at 149–50 (indicating that the Secretary must be able to back
up his assertions of additional goals of the Medicaid Act with reasonable
proof).
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waiver programs is deemed arbitrary and capricious by the
courts. 147
(2) Fiscal Sustainability as a Sub-Objective of Providing
Medicaid Coverage
Section 1115 focuses the Secretary’s evaluation of specific
demonstration projects’ impact on furthering the objectives of
Medicaid. 148 The district court found that Section 1115 assumes
a good-faith compliance with the larger Medicaid Act when
permitting the Secretary to waive states’ compliance with
certain parts of the Medicaid Act in order to carry out their
waiver programs. 149 In Stewart II, Kentucky threatened to
de-expand Medicaid if its Section 1115 waiver was not
approved. 150 The court highlighted that the Secretary cannot
move on evaluating whether Kentucky’s Section 1115 program
promoted the objectives of the Medicaid Act when the program
did not have baseline compliance with the Medicaid Act. 151
Thus, the defendants’ argument that approval of Kentucky
HEALTH promoted Medicaid coverage fails, since the
alternative proposition was that Kentucky cease compliance
with the Medicaid Act in total. 152
2. The Administrative Procedure Act
In Stewart II, the district court also struck down the
Secretary’s approval of Kentucky HEALTH on the grounds that

147. See infra Part IV.A.2.
148. See § 1315 (focusing on the demonstration projects within the larger
context of the Medicaid Act).
149. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 154 (dismissing the defendants’
argument for Kentucky HEALTH approval because, if the program were not
approved, Kentucky would allegedly de-expand its Medicaid program, which
would not be a good-faith compliance with the Medicaid Act).
150. See id. at 153 (presenting Kentucky’s argument that, without the
work requirements from Kentucky HEALTH, Kentucky would not be able to
financially sustain its Medicaid expansion population).
151. See id. (finding that defendants’ argument lacked a limiting principle
and that baseline compliance with the Medicaid Act is necessary for the
Secretary’s approval of a waiver program to be reasonable).
152. See id. (“This coverage-promotion argument, in fact, does not depend
on fiscal sustainability at all.”).
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this approval was arbitrary and capricious. 153 The
Administrative Procedure Act 154 provides that when a court is
reviewing an agency action, the court shall “hold unlawful and
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law.” 155 To determine whether an action is
arbitrary and capricious, “the court must consider whether the
decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and
whether there has been a clear error of judgment.” 156 This
evaluation also examines whether the Secretary followed the
“necessary procedural requirements” when taking the agency
action. 157 Further, the reviewing court must only consider the
grounds on which the agency made its decision; the court cannot
substitute “what it considers to be a more adequate or proper
basis” for the agency’s action. 158
153. See id. at 131 (“As a consequence, once again finding the reapproval
was both contrary to the Act and arbitrary and capricious, the Court will
vacate it and remand to HHS for further review.”); see also Invented Purposes,
supra note 51, at 118 (“Under the Administrative Procedure Act’s ‘arbitrary
and capricious’ standard governing judicial review, the court concluded that
its duty was to review the legality of the work experiment (known as Kentucky
HEALTH) ‘as a whole,’ rather than approaching each experimental element
piecemeal.”).
154. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–59, 701–06 (2018).
155. Id. § 706.
156. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971). See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983) (“[A] court is not to substitute its judgment for that of
the agency. Nevertheless, the agency must examine the relevant data and
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” (quoting Burlington
Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))).
157. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. at 416 (adding
that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review is a narrow standard); see
also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.
158. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (stating that, to
maintain the proper separation of powers balance, a court must only consider
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In this case, the court used the conclusion that the
Secretary’s approval violated the Medicaid Act as evidence that
the Secretary’s approval was arbitrary and capricious. 159 The
district court focused on the fact that the Secretary did not
adequately consider the loss in Medicaid coverage for
beneficiaries resulting from Kentucky HEALTH when making
his approval determination. 160 The district court pointed to the
Secretary’s failure to weigh the alleged health benefits of
Kentucky HEALTH against the concerning amount of coverage
loss as evidence of the Secretary’s arbitrary and capricious
decision. 161 The district court noted that the Secretary also
failed to weigh the alleged benefits of beneficiary financial
independence against widespread coverage loss. 162 The
Secretary’s failure to consider coverage loss when approving
Kentucky HEALTH indicated that the approval was arbitrary
and capricious, notwithstanding the Secretary’s argument in
favor of promoting Medicaid fiscal sustainability. 163

the rationale that an agency sets forth and may not read in the court’s own
basis for an action).
159. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 137 (finding that, since the
Secretary did not adequately consider the objectives of the Medicaid Act as
required by 42 U.S.C. § 1315 in his approval of Kentucky HEALTH, the
Secretary’s approval is arbitrary and capricious).
160. See id. at 140 (noting that the Secretary had not conducted the type
of “reasoned decision-making” required of him regarding estimated coverage
loss numbers); see also Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015) (citing
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998))
(stating that an agency’s decision-making process must be reasoned, logical,
and rational).
161. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 145 (stating that the Secretary’s
reasoning that Kentucky HEALTH promotes the health of Medicaid
beneficiaries ignores the fact that Kentucky HEALTH will cause widespread
Medicaid coverage loss, thus affecting the health of those beneficiaries).
162. See id. at 148 (“Even if some number of beneficiaries were to gain
independence, the Secretary does not weigh the benefits of their
self-sufficiency against the consequences of coverage loss, which would harm
and undermine the financial self-sufficiency of others.”).
163. See id. (“[The Secretary] unreasonably prioritized program savings
without weighing those against the consequences of lost coverage, rendering
his determination arbitrary and capricious.”); see also Newton-Nations v.
Betlach, 660 F.3d 370, 381 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that approval of a Medicaid
waiver under 42 U.S.C. § 1315 is arbitrary and capricious if the purpose of
approval is to save the Medicaid program money).
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B. Gresham v. Azar
In 2017, Arkansas amended its existing Section 1115
waiver to include the state’s work requirements program,
Arkansas Works. 164 The work requirement applied to members
of the Medicaid expansion population aged nineteen to fortynine, requiring beneficiaries to record eighty hours per month of
activities such as work, school, volunteering, or searching for a
job. 165 Failure to report satisfactory activities for three months
would result in the beneficiary losing Medicaid coverage for the
rest of the calendar year. 166 However, many beneficiaries
reported difficulty using the system Arkansas created for
reporting work requirements, including having their accounts
suspended for entering the wrong data, as well as basic
technology illiteracy problems such as understanding how to
create an online account and having regular access to a
computer. 167 Ultimately, over 18,000 Medicaid beneficiaries in
Arkansas lost their coverage due to the work requirements
rule. 168 As a result, a group of Medicaid beneficiaries in
Arkansas filed suit challenging the Secretary’s approval of
Arkansas’s Section 1115 waiver. 169
164. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d 93, 96–97 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (providing
background on Arkansas’s work requirements program).
165. See Erin Brantley & Leighton Ku, A First Glance at Medicaid Work
Requirements in Arkansas: More Than One-Quarter Did Not Meet
Requirement, HEALTH AFF. (Aug. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/6RSR9VBT?type=image (discussing the specific reporting requirements to satisfy
the program’s work requirements).
166. See id. (noting the implications of failing to properly report qualifying
activities).
167. See Jacqueline Froelich, In Arkansas, Thousands of People Have Lost
Medicaid Coverage Over New Work Requirements, NPR (Feb. 18, 2019),
https://perma.cc/CT5U-K5VG (highlighting the difficulty in the logistics of
implementing the work requirements program and the effect these difficulties
have on Medicaid coverage).
168. See Abby Goodnough, Appeals Court Rejects Trump Medicaid Work
Requirements in Arkansas, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2020), https://perma.cc/FXE6TXKU (explaining the drastic loss in coverage experienced by Arkansas
Medicaid beneficiaries). For a more thorough evaluation of Arkansas’s
Medicaid work requirements program, see Brantley & Ku, supra note 165
(analyzing the impact of Arkansas’s Section 1115 work requirements waiver
on the Medicaid population before the program was halted).
169. See Gresham I, 363 F. Supp. 3d 165, 168–69 (D.D.C. 2019) (discussing
the plaintiffs’ background in bringing this case).
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The court of appeals consolidated the appeals for both
Stewart II and Gresham I into Gresham II, although Kentucky
voluntarily dismissed its appeal after oral arguments. 170 Judge
David Sentelle, writing the unanimous opinion, first established
that the Secretary’s approval of Section 1115 waivers is subject
to judicial review. 171 The court then addressed whether the
district court correctly identified the objectives of the Medicaid
Act and whether the Secretary’s approval of Arkansas’s Section
1115 violated the APA. 172
1. The Medicaid Act
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s finding
that the primary objective of Medicaid is to provide health care
coverage. 173 In making this ruling, the court of appeals
emphasized that at least four other courts of appeals as well as
the United States Supreme Court had all made similar findings
about the objective of Medicaid. 174 In the letter initially
170. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 96–97 (providing the procedural history
for the case); see also Letter from Andy Beshear, Gov., Ky., to Andrea Casart,
Dir., Div. of Medicaid Expansion Demonstrations, Ctrs. for Medicare &
Medicaid Servs. (Dec. 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/6LNR-UP9U (PDF) (stating
that, due to Kentucky’s gubernatorial election resulting in a new governor, the
state would be terminating its work requirements program).
171. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 98 (rejecting the government’s argument
that courts cannot review the Secretary’s approval of Section 1115 waivers);
see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971)
(stating that judicial review is appropriate in all cases except where Congress
has expressly prohibited it).
172. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 99 (stating that the court will review the
district court’s decision de novo).
173. See id. (agreeing with the district court that Section 1115 waivers
should be measured against whether they promote health care coverage).
174. See Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268,
275 (2006) (“The Medicaid program . . . provides joint federal and state
funding of medical care for individuals who cannot afford to pay their own
medical costs.”); Pharm. Research & Mfrs. Of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F. 3d 66,
75 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that the main purpose of Medicaid is to provide
medical services to those who cannot provide for themselves); W. Va. Univ.
Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F. 2d 11, 20 (3d Cir. 1989) (“We recognize, of course,
that the primary purpose of Medicaid is to achieve the praiseworthy social
objective of granting health care coverage to those who cannot afford it.”); Price
v. Medicaid Dir., 838 F. 3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2016) (stating that Medicaid
permits the government to give money to states to pay for the medical costs of
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approving Arkansas Works, CMS evaluated Arkansas Works
against three additional objectives of Medicaid similar to those
the district court addressed in Stewart II. 175 The court of appeals
dismissed these alternate objectives as lacking textual support
in the Medicaid Act. 176 Rather, the statute only calls for the
“furnish[ing of] medical assistance” to the poor. 177 Additionally,
the court of appeals noted that Congress amended several social
welfare programs in the 1990s to include work requirements,
including TANF. 178 Given that Congress did not similarly
amend Medicaid at this time, Congress did not intend for
Medicaid to have work requirements. 179 Thus, the court of
appeals held that the primary objective of Medicaid is providing
health care coverage without any additional restrictions. 180
2. The Administrative Procedure Act
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s finding
that the Secretary’s approval of the Section 1115 work
requirements waiver was arbitrary and capricious. 181 When
deciding whether to approve a waiver or not, the Secretary must
show that he has considered all “important aspect[s] of the
needy people); Univ. of Wash. Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 634 F. 3d 1029, 1031 (9th
Cir. 2011) (describing Medicaid as a federal grant program that provides
medical services to those who cannot afford them).
175. See Letter from Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs., to Asa Hutchinson, Governor, Arkansas, (March 5, 2018), https://
perma.cc/DF38-7GUB (PDF) (identifying the objectives of the Medicaid Act as
improving health outcomes, addressing factors that affect health outcomes,
and engaging beneficiaries in their own care).
176. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d 93, 101 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“These three
alternative objectives all point to better health outcomes as the objective of
Medicaid, but that alternative objective lacks textual support. Indeed, the
statute makes no mention of that objective.”).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2018).
178. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 102 (citing Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, sec. 103,
§ 407, 110 Stat. 2105, 2129–34) (stating that Congress has a history of
amending social welfare programs to implement work requirements).
179. See id. (discussing Congressional intent behind amending certain
social welfare programs).
180. See id. (affirming the district court’s ruling in Stewart II).
181. See id. (finding that the Secretary’s failure to consider coverage loss
renders his approval arbitrary and capricious).
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problem.” 182 In Gresham II, the court focused on the Secretary’s
failure to consider the impact of Arkansas Works on beneficiary
coverage, specifically whether the waiver program would cause
coverage loss. 183 The court of appeals viewed coverage loss as
directly related to the Medicaid objective of providing health
care coverage, and found that the Secretary provided no
in-depth analysis regarding this objective. 184 Instead, the
Secretary’s approval centered around the alternative objectives
of Medicaid he identified, such as promoting beneficiaries’
engagement with their health care. 185 Since the Secretary
disregarded the Section 1115 waiver program’s impact on
beneficiaries’ health care coverage, the court of appeals held
that the Secretary’s action was arbitrary and capricious. 186
The court of appeals’ opinion in Gresham II is particularly
notable because Judge David Sentelle authored the opinion. 187
Judge Sentelle is often referred to as “one of the most
conservative judges in the country” and serves as a mentor to
his prior clerk Justice Neil Gorsuch. 188 Some legal scholars posit
that the Trump Administration may abandon Section 1115
programs such as Arkansas Works because such a respected

182. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (discussing reasons why a court may find an agency action
arbitrary and capricious).
183. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 103 (noting that the Secretary dismissed
the concerns about coverage loss rather than engage directly with the issue).
184. See id. (“In total, the Secretary’s analysis of the substantial and
important problem is to note the concerns of others and dismiss those concerns
in a handful of conclusory sentences.”).
185. See Verma, supra note 175 (evaluating Arkansas Works based on
alternative measures rather than focusing on the program’s effect on Medicaid
coverage).
186. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 104 (holding that it is arbitrary and
capricious to “prioritize non-statutory objectives to the exclusion of the
statutory purpose”).
187. See id. at 94 (noting the three judges who heard the case and the judge
who authored the opinion).
188. Ian Millhiser, Trump Just Got Bad News From Neil Gorsuch’s Mentor
in a Big Medicaid Case, VOX (Feb. 14, 2020), https://perma.cc/P5PK-X39N; see
Alexander Somodevilla & Sara Rosenbaum, Inside the D.C. Circuit’s Opinion
in Gresham v. Azar, HEALTH AFF. (Feb 20, 2020), https://perma.cc/M5YKT76A?type=image (referring to Judge Sentelle as one of the most conservative
members of the D.C. Circuit).
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conservative judge issued a strong condemnation of the
program. 189
V. Application of Current Case Law to Amendment 42 and the
Healthy Adult Opportunity Program
The courts’ rulings in Stewart II and Gresham II are
important because they provide a framework for courts to use
when faced with future challenges to the Secretary’s Section
1115 waiver authority. 190 This Note will first apply the
reasoning in Stewart II and Gresham II to Amendment 42. 191
Next, this Note will turn to the Trump Administration’s recently
released guidance to states on drafting Section 1115 waivers
asking for Medicaid block grants. 192 Under the Gresham II
court’s logic, the Secretary should not approve either
Amendment 42 or HAO waivers because such approval would
be unlawful and immediately struck down by the courts. 193
A. Amendment 42
1. Promoting the Objectives of Medicaid
Section 1115 waivers must further the objectives of the
Medicaid Act. 194 The Gresham II court noted that the principal
189. See Somodevilla & Rosenbaum, supra note 188 (hypothesizing about
the Trump Administration’s next move regarding Section 1115 work
requirements programs).
190. See Sachs & Huberfeld, supra note 10 (suggesting that CMS’
solicitation of block grant proposals, and states submission of such proposals,
is “courting yet another legal battle” in light of Stewart).
191. See Tony Pugh, Tennessee Seeks Federal Approval to Block Grant
Medicaid Program, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 20, 2019), https://perma.cc/SN3SWGTC (reporting that Tennessee filed its proposal with CMS on November
20, 2019 and that CMS approval of the proposal would be the first of its kind).
192. See Lynch, supra note 14 (explaining that CMS will now support state
proposals to receive Medicaid as a block grant through Section 1115 waiver
programs).
193. See Alice Hall-Partyka et al., Tennessee Proposes First of Its Kind
Block Grant Program for Medicaid, C&M HEALTH L. (Sept 24, 2019), https://
perma.cc/YN42-FGBR (“Approval of Tennessee’s proposal would likely trigger
similar litigation against CMS.”).
194. See infra Part IV and accompanying text; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1315
(2018) (mandating that the Secretary only approve demonstration projects
that “are likely to assist in promoting the objectives” of the Medicaid Act).
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objective of the Medicaid Act is to provide medical assistance to
needy populations. 195 This objective has two elements: whether
the project causes beneficiaries to lose coverage and whether the
project promotes Medicaid coverage. 196
The experimental nature of Amendment 42 does not
“sanction a demonstration that would result in significant
coverage loss, nor does it relieve the Secretary of his obligation
to consider the magnitude of coverage loss.” 197 When considering
whether to approve Amendment 42, the Secretary must
adequately consider the impact of the proposal on beneficiary
coverage. 198 However, Amendment 42 does not explicitly
address the potential impact of the demonstration project on
enrollment for current beneficiaries. 199 In fact, Amendment 42
requests that Tennessee be preemptively exempted from any
federal coverage mandate that may arise during the lifetime of
the demonstration project. 200 The proposal even goes so far as to
acknowledge that Tennessee is not providing the federal
government with specific information and metrics about the
impact of Amendment 42 on beneficiary coverage. 201 Given the
195. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d 93, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (stating that the
primary objective of Medicaid is to provide medical assistance).
196. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 140 (D.D.C. 2019) (quoting
Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 262 (D.D.C. 2018)) (restating the district
court’s findings from the previous proceeding about the elements of the first
objective of the Medicaid Act).
197. Id.
198. See Humane Soc’y v. Zinke, 865 F.3d 585, 607 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (stating
that the Secretary must consider all “salient factors” when making an agency
decision).
199. Compare An Update, supra note 76 (noting that the proposal does not
address the potential impact of Amendment 42 on current beneficiaries), with
Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 141 (stating that Kentucky provided an
estimated beneficiary coverage loss should the state’s Section 1115 waiver
take effect); see also Perkins, supra note 90 (“[T]he document is extremely
vague on the specifics of what the State is proposing to do and how those
proposals will affect stakeholders, from enrollees to managed care
organizations.”).
200. See TENN. DIV. OF TENNCARE, supra note 4, at 12 (“[I]t is expected that
Tennessee will be exempt from any new federal mandates over the life of the
demonstration that could have a material impact on the state’s Medicaid
expenditures (e.g., mandates concerning eligibility or covered benefits).”).
201. See id. at 13 (“[I]t is not the intention of the state to enumerate in
detail in this document every innovation, reform, or policy change that might
take place over the life of the demonstration.”).
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lack of specific information about the potential loss of coverage
beneficiaries would face due to Amendment 42, the Secretary
should not approve Tennessee’s proposal. 202
The second element in furnishing medical assistance is
whether the Section 1115 waiver program promotes Medicaid
coverage. 203 In the proposal, Tennessee provides a list of alleged
health reform benefits of shifting to a block grant model, but
notably does not include coverage expansion as one such
benefit. 204 Tennessee does mention “covering additional needy
individuals” as a priority of Amendment 42, but provides no
additional details on how exactly the state plans to achieve this
goal. 205 Thus, the Secretary cannot approve Amendment 42 on
the grounds that the demonstration project promotes Medicaid
coverage because Tennessee has given the Secretary little
information and evidence to evaluate. 206
When reviewing Amendment 42 for approval, the Secretary
should not consider whether the proposal promotes other
alternative objectives identified by the Secretary. 207 The
Gresham II court did not directly address the Stewart II court’s
consideration of fiscal sustainability as another potential

202. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 102 (citing the Secretary’s failure to
account for the significant coverage loss as a crucial error).
203. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 140 (D.D.C. 2019) (finding that
coverage promotion is an important component of providing medical
assistance to needy populations).
204. See TENN. DIV. OF TENNCARE, supra note 4, at 3 (providing several
“core health care reform principles” that the state would expand under the
Medicaid block grant).
205. See id. at 24 (listing several priorities for the demonstration project).
206. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 143 (discussing the importance of
the Secretary’s ability to evaluate whether or not a Section 1115
demonstration project promotes Medicaid coverage); see also Gresham II, 950
F.3d 93, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (noting that, notwithstanding the fact that
Arkansas did not provide any coverage loss analysis, the Secretary had enough
information to realize that such an analysis was required).
207. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 100–01 (dismissing the Secretary’s
evaluation of Arkansas Works against alternative objectives of Medicaid as
unrelated to the primary objective of Medicaid); Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d
125, 138 (D.D.C. 2019) (finding that promotion of either health or financial
independence is not a valid objective of the Medicaid Act).
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objective of Medicaid. 208 Under the Stewart II ruling, however,
the Secretary may be able to consider Amendment 42’s impact
on the fiscal sustainability on Tennessee’s Medicaid program
when evaluating whether to approve the project or not. 209
One of the main goals of Amendment 42 is to “demonstrate
that an alternative model of federal participation in state
Medicaid programs will lead to Medicaid programs that are
more financially sustainable for states and the federal
government . . . .” 210 The proposed block grant model will permit
Tennessee to reinvest unspent federal dollars back into “the
state’s needy populations.” 211 However, other than a few
sentences naming fiscal sustainability of Medicaid as a goal of
Amendment 42, Tennessee provides no specific details for the
Secretary on how precisely Amendment 42 will make Medicaid
more sustainable. 212 As the court stated in Stewart II, the
Secretary “must give an adequate explanation” for why
Amendment 42 supports the objectives of the Medicaid Act that
is “supported by substantial evidence.” 213 Even if Tennessee
provided more information about the fiscal sustainability
objective, the Secretary would still be required to weigh this
positive against potential coverage loss from Amendment 42. 214
Tennessee contends that the format of the block grant
encourages the state to save money because any savings are
208. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 98–99 (stating that the court granted
Kentucky’s motion to dismiss the Stewart II appeal and so the court of appeals
never reached the questions presented in that case about fiscal sustainability);
see also Somodevilla & Rosenbaum, supra note 188 (noting that the court of
appeals did not consider the fiscal sustainability argument as it was not raised
in the Arkansas case).
209. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 149 (“Defendants may, as a result,
take into account fiscal sustainability in determining under § 1315 whether a
demonstration project promotes the objectives of the [Medicaid] Act.”).
210. TENN. DIV. OF TENNCARE, supra note 4, at 26.
211. See id. at 4 (describing the proposed incentives for the state to wisely
spend its Medicaid dollars under the block grant model).
212. See An Update, supra note 76 (noting that Tennessee’s proposal
provides little detail on how the state will accomplish its goals).
213. Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 149.
214. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 103 (finding that the Secretary did not
engage in adequate analysis regarding potential coverage loss); Stewart II, 366
F. Supp. 3d at 149 (stating that the Secretary must do more than identify an
objective of Medicaid, he must show how the demonstration project specifically
furthers that objective).
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split between the state and the federal government. 215 However,
opponents of Amendment 42 argue that the shared savings
model incentivizes Tennessee to “cut Medicaid benefits and
services.” 216 Any such cuts should prominently factor into the
Secretary’s balancing test in considering whether Tennessee’s
promotion of fiscal sustainability meets the requirement that
Section 1115 waivers must further the objectives of the
Medicaid Act. 217
2. The Administrative Procedure Act
As discussed previously, 218 the Secretary should not
approve Amendment 42 or similar block grant Section 1115
waivers because they do not further the objectives of the
Medicaid Act. 219 If the Secretary were to approve a
demonstration project such as Amendment 42, the courts would
likely strike down such an approval as arbitrary and capricious
because the demonstration project does not further the
objectives of the Medicaid Act. 220 The Secretary would have to
prove to the court that, in making his decision to approve
Amendment 42, he properly considered “the relevant factors”

215. See TENN. DIV. OF TENNCARE, supra note 4, at iii (“Tennessee proposes
that in any year in which the state underspends its block grant, the state and
the federal government share in the resulting savings.”).
216. See Pugh, supra note 191 (providing potential cuts Tennessee may
make to Medicaid services due to the structure of the block grant).
217. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d 93, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (noting that the
Secretary disregarded the primary objective of Medicaid in his approval of
Arkansas Works); Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 152 (“[T]he Secretary must
engage in considered analysis of the fiscal-sustainability concern . . . .”); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2018) (stating that the Secretary’s judgment determines
whether a demonstration project furthers the objectives of the Medicaid Act).
218. See supra Part IV.
219. See Sachs & Huberfeld, supra note 10 (arguing that any block grant
model would violate the objectives of the Medicaid Act because it would
incentivize disenrolling beneficiaries from the program).
220. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 104 (stating that to avoid a finding of
arbitrary and capricious review, the Secretary needs to analyze the loss of
beneficiary coverage); Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 137 (D.D.C. 2019)
(using the Secretary’s failure to properly consider the objectives of the
Medicaid Act as evidence that the Secretary’s approval of Kentucky’s waiver
was arbitrary and capricious).
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and available data. 221 Because Tennessee provided such sparse
details about Amendment 42’s potential impact on Medicaid
coverage, as well as how Amendment 42 would promote fiscal
sustainability, the Secretary would find it difficult to produce a
robust record and appropriately weigh the factors relevant to
his approval. 222
B. Healthy Adult Opportunity Waiver Program
1. Promoting the Objectives of the Medicaid Act
In the Letter to State Medicaid Directors concerning the
HAO program, CMS specifically calls for states to submit
proposals for Section 1115 block grant projects that “are likely
to assist in promoting the objectives of the Medicaid
program.” 223 Instead of stating that the objective of Medicaid is
to provide medical assistance to needy populations, 224 the letter
identifies the objective of Medicaid as “the furnishing of medical
assistance in a manner that promotes the sustainability of
government health care spending . . . .” 225 However, the court in
Gresham II emphasized that the text of the Medicaid Act
“specifically addresses only coverage” as the objective of statute,
and to go beyond this clear objective is not permitted. 226
Although the district court in Stewart II acknowledged that
221. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
416 (1971) (requiring the Secretary to properly consider the evidence before
him when making an agency decision).
222. See Newton-Nations v. Betlach, 660 F.3d 370, 381 (9th Cir. 2011)
(finding the Secretary’s approval of a Section 1115 waiver arbitrary and
capricious because the Secretary produced no record indicating that they had
actually made findings about the program’s impact on the objectives of the
Medicaid Act); see also Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1074 (9th Cir. 1994)
(stating that the Secretary needs to provide evidence that they considered the
impact of the Section 1115 waiver project on the state’s Medicaid population).
223. See Lynch, supra note 14 (discussing the requirements for successful
Section 1115 demonstration projects).
224. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2018) (discussing the objective of the Medicaid
Act).
225. Id.
226. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 100–01 (refusing to recognize the
Secretary’s identified additional objectives of Medicaid as legitimate because
Congress intended for providing medical coverage to be the primary Medicaid
objective).
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fiscal sustainability may be an objective that the Secretary can
consider, 227 the court of appeals did not consider this issue on
appeal. 228 The HAO letter’s failure to specify the provision of
health coverage to low-income individuals as the objective of
Medicaid indicates that a court should strike down any HAO
approvals. 229 As the Stewart II court addressed, the effect of the
Section 1115 program on beneficiary coverage is a key aspect of
promoting the objective of Medicaid. 230
Importantly, HAO initiatives only apply to adults who are
not already eligible for Medicaid under a state’s normal
Medicaid plan, such as the Medicaid expansion population. 231
For some states, the ability to receive certain portions of
Medicaid as a block grant may incentivize them to expand
Medicaid, thus providing health coverage to more individuals
and promoting the objective of Medicaid. 232 However, the
Kentucky HEALTH work requirements also applied to the
expansion population and the district court still struck the
waiver down as violating the objectives of Medicaid due to the
resulting coverage loss. 233 If HAO demonstration projects also
result in significant coverage loss, they would similarly be
struck down by the courts regardless of which Medicaid

227. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 149 (finding that the Secretary’s
consideration of fiscal sustainability was not an unreasonable interpretation
of Medicaid’s objectives).
228. See Somodevilla & Rosenbaum, supra note 189 (stating that fiscal
sustainability may be a legitimate argument since the court of appeals did not
definitively rule on this issue).
229. See Rudowitz et al., supra note 68 (“[Work requirements] lawsuits
have been decided based on the finding that the primary objective of the
Medicaid program is to provide affordable coverage to low-income people,
which is not highlighted as a program objective for the HAOs.”).
230. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 140 (discussing the role of
beneficiary coverage in furnishing medical assistance to the needy).
231. See Lynch, supra note 14 (“We expect that coverage under an HAO
demonstration will focus on adults under age 65 who are not eligible for
coverage under the state plan.”).
232. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2018) (stating that the purpose of Medicaid is
to provide coverage to needy populations).
233. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 138 (D.D.C. 2019) (noting that
the objective of Medicaid applies equally to both the non-expansion and
expansion population).
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population the project applied to. 234 The coverage loss could
result from states who seek to transition an existing Medicaid
population to an HAO demonstration project. 235 Additionally,
the HAO demonstration project itself could implement such
changes as capping total Medicaid enrollment, imposing
cost-sharing requirements on beneficiaries, restricting the
drugs covered by Medicaid, and restricting Medicaid coverage to
those with certain medical diagnoses. 236 Further, under the
HAO initiative states can also impose work requirements,
eliminate retroactive eligibility, and suspend coverage for those
beneficiaries who do not pay their premiums. 237 While the letter
includes a process for “transitioning existing Section 1115
demonstrations into a state’s HAO demonstration,” the letter
does not provide any information about protecting against
coverage loss. 238
2. Administrative Procedure Act
As the court stated in Gresham II, the failure of CMS and
the Secretary to account for coverage loss ultimately rendered
approval of such Section 1115 waiver programs arbitrary and
capricious. 239 To avoid such an outcome, the Secretary would
have to carefully consider data submitted by states with their
HAO program proposals about the programs’ potential impact

234. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d 93, 102 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“[T]he loss of
coverage for beneficiaries is an important aspect of the demonstration
approval because coverage is a principal objective of Medicaid . . . .”).
235. See Lynch, supra note 14 (stating that states can transfer existing
Medicaid beneficiaries to this new program).
236. See Paige Winfield Cunningham, The Trump Administration Calls It
‘Healthy Adult Opportunity.’ Critics Call It Less Medicaid, WASH. POST (Jan.
31, 2020, 7:18 AM), https://perma.cc/RES9-CG59 (discussing the significant
changes an HAO demonstration could impose on Medicaid beneficiaries).
237. See Rudowitz, et al., supra note 68 (discussing ways in which the HAO
program permits states to limit Medicaid coverage).
238. See Lynch, supra note 14 (providing guidance on transitioning
coverage from one Section 1115 demonstration to another, but failing to
suggest safeguards against significant coverage loss).
239. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 102–03 (focusing on the Secretary’s
failure to analyze potential coverage loss from Arkansas Works).
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on coverage. 240 However, the HAO letter does not specifically
encourage states to analyze and present such data to the
Secretary, resulting in courts ruling that any approval of an
HAO program is arbitrary and capricious. 241
VI. Conclusion
If current health care and political trends continue, many
states are likely to submit controversial Section 1115 proposals
that potentially violate the Medicaid Act as interpreted in
Stewart II and Gresham II. 242 By ruling against both Arkansas’s
and Kentucky’s Section 1115 waivers, the courts have taken a
clear stance on which types of proposals are permissible and
which are not. 243 The court ruling had a profound effect on the
Medicaid landscape in Kentucky, as the current governor has
terminated the Kentucky HEALTH program based on the
court’s decision. 244 The courts should continue to enforce the
Medicaid Act and the APA and strike down any Section 1115
proposals seeking to convert Medicaid into a block grant. 245
Although the Medicaid Act and Section 1115 waivers permit a

240. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
416 (1971) (stating that the Secretary must evaluate relevant data in making
a decision).
241. See Somodevilla & Rosenbaum, supra note 188 (noting that any
coverage losses stemming from approval of a Section 1115 program should be
central to the Secretary’s decision to approve such a program).
242. See Lynch, supra note 14 (inviting states to apply for Section 1115
waivers that would convert Medicaid into a block grant program); see also
Gresham II, 950 F.3d at 96 (holding that the Secretary’s approval of these
Section 1115 waivers is arbitrary and capricious); Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d
at 131 (finding that the Secretary’s action in approving the Section 1115
waiver violates the Medicaid Act).
243. See Fishman & Weissfeld, supra note 65 (discussing the impact of the
successful work requirements litigation on other Section 1115 waiver
proposals).
244. See Beshear, supra note 170 (terminating the Kentucky HEALTH
demonstration project based on the ruling in Stewart v. Azar).
245. See Gresham II, 950 F.3d 93, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (finding the
Secretary’s analysis of the impact of Arkansas Works on beneficiary coverage
to be no more than a few sentences); Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 131
(D.D.C. 2019) (finding that, since Kentucky HEALTH did not advance the
objectives of the Medicaid Act, the Secretary’s approval of the program was
arbitrary and capricious).
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degree of innovation and flexibility, 246 it is up to the courts to
protect the interests of Medicaid beneficiaries and ensure that
any decisions made by the Secretary are based on a robust
record that ensures adequate coverage protection. 247 Otherwise,
beneficiaries like six year-old Asher will be left without
medically necessary treatment and their families will be forced
into financial hardship. 248

246. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2018) (noting that Section 1115 programs are
experimental in nature).
247. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 143 (stating that the Secretary
failed to provide enough detail about how Kentucky HEALTH would advance
coverage promotion).
248. See Bliss, supra note 2 (stating that Asher, after contracting a serious
respiratory illness due to her disabilities, received a $1.8 million medical bill
from her required medical treatments).

